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I. INTRODUCTION
Philosophers in the liberal political tradition have been troubled by
the role of religious speech in democratic civic arguments at least since
Locke.' W h a t troubles them most, however, is not really religious
speech. I t is that all their responses to the problem of religious speech,
without exception, force them to wrestle with the fact that democratic
civic arguments are rhetorical and that it is the rhetorical nature of its
civic arguments that gives to democracy its unique and precious value as
a form of government.
Democracy and rhetoric share a trust in argument. I t is a trust in
what persuades us as we are and not as we should be. This is not a trust
of all that is human, but of this aspect of our humanity. I t is individual
because we are. I n persuasion, each of us retains an ultimate authority,
cosmological if you like, to say no to any offered argument. This final
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authority to withhold assent makes us, each of us, mysterious.
mocracy,
2 I n asa in rhetoric,
d e all
- preferences are undemocratically held.
The rule of law within, and the justifications for, a democracy depend upon respect for this mystery. Because each of us is mysterious, all
voices in a democracy should be heard, each equal to the other, in all
matters of social importance to the practical extent that they can be given
our need to make decisions and to make them timely. Other principles
that democracy and rhetoric serve, like freedom and equality, are not
foundational to either but are subordinate to this trust and the respect it
mandates. T r us t in democracy as in rhetoric, as a recognition of the
given meaning of each individual hie, is morally prior to these principles
or any other moralities of conduct We can say, then, with Wittgenstein,
that in a democracy, as in rhetoric, "suicide is t h e elementary s in,'
Because a democracy is a rhetorical community, the ways in which
we are alike and what may or may not be shared among us, including
des of speech and sources of authority, are discovered and rediscover
telligible"
or "publicly comprehensible" through speech' can never be
e
dmore than a sociological claim about the current dominance or p
t n
h c mocracy, founded on our difference, has no part to play in the reand ultimately disrespectful insistence upon sameness that drives
e
rlentless
alloliberal theories.
o
All this, as you can readiltt
is terribly awkward for philosophy
uf
an awkwardness most revealed in
incthe liberal political tradition. g
the consideration of religious speedi
mocratic civic argument, and
his eto this
what follows, I will first exr
pairline
and reject liberal political me
f addressing the oestion of
t
ereligious
speech
in
civic
argument,
hich
depend upon norms exs ubj
a
re
temal
c t to the argument that are then excluded from it. Next, in proposing
i
sa
method
that relies only upon the constitutive norms of civic argument
t h
ua nelf,!
will
offer a description of civic argument as rhetoric, examine the
t
m
arisks
w of religious rhetoric in this civic argument, and examine the constise o e norms of civic argument. I will see if the constitutive norms of
d argument are sufficient restraints upon religious rhetoric such that
icw
W
oi e
nl s 2. The most interesting and Ariporiant version o f this argument 1 have read s fiamd in JOSEPH
o THE SONG SPARROW AND THE C L A I M S OF SCIENCE AND HUMANITY 15-21 (2004),
oVINING,
lProfessor Vining. is not as interested as I am in politic al applications o f the argument, Th e re are
f o f epistemology at work in this. Essentially, any honestly held epistemological grounds for
vissues
r
an argument ai r deemed as reasonably held in democratic civic argument, as in all rhetori c
ei s
for such is. its nature,
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reliance upon external norms is not only not required but cannot be justified in a democracy. Finally, I will conclude with a brief assessment of
the tension between religion and the constitutive requirements of civic
argument in a democracy.
LIBERAL METHODSOFADDRESSING RELIGIOUSSPEECH
Liberal political philosophers have offered a variety of methods for
coping with the awkwardness that democracy, as a rhetorical community,
presents that burden, rather than trust, religious speech. These methods,
however, fall into the same general patterns and all fail for the same reason: They depend upon antecedently given norms that are to be excluded
from democratic civic argument in a very non-rhetorical manner. First,
there are claims of neutral grounds for the burdening of religious speech
that can always be revealed as not neutral but that require strong normative commitments. Those making claims of neutrality—either general
claims towards any commitment to the good or specific claims toward
religion—typically ignore, exclude, or underappreciate what can be seen
as rather ordinary religiously based concerns about the appropriate valuing of autonomy, choice, and authority. These concerns are the concerns
that would have best revealed the hidden normative commitments within
each claim of neutrality.
Let me give two examples, one specific and one general, selected
because they are central in the arguments of two authors who have been
zealous in revealing these non-neutral commitments: Stanley Fish and
Stanley Hauerwas.
Stanley Fish cites Mozert v. Hawkins, brought by a Christian mother who objected, on establishment-of-religion grounds, to her sixth-grade
child being assigned a text that "aimed at fostering a broad tolerance for
all o f man's diversity" by "expos[ing] readers to a variety of religious
beliefs, without attempting to suggest that one is better than another."'
The mother lost. T he superintendent's winning argument was that the
mother "misunderst[ood] the fact that exposure to something does not
constitute teaching, indoctrination, o r promotion of the thing exposed."
5 But what the superintendent and the judges who agreed with him
S t fail
a to understand in their turn is that the distinction between expon l esure and indoctrination is an artifact of the very liberalism [the
y mother] rejects. That is, the distinction only makes sense if you asF i
s h
4. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 582 F. Supp. 201, 202 (ED. Tenn. 1984), rev'd, 765
a 75
r (6th Cir. 1985).
F.2d
g u5. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827•Fld 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987).
e s
:
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sume, first, that the mind is a cognitive machine that can always
draw back from the ideas presented to it and assess them by independent rational criteria; second, that this is what the mind, i f it is
working properly, is supposed to do; and, third, that a conviction
held in any other way, held in conformity with authority rather than
as the conclusion of a process of critical reasoning, is not a conviction worth having.
6
He goes on:
When [this mother] hears someone invoke the distinction between
exposure and indoctrination, it doesn't sound to her like common
sense but rather the presumptuousness and arrogant attempt o f a
nonbeliever to prescribe for her the conditions and the nature of her
belief.
7
In my second, more general example, Stanley Hauerwas makes the
same point in memorable fashion:
[L]ibemlism can be characterized as the presumption that you
should have no story other than the story you chose when you had
no story. A society constituted to produce people who get to choose
their stories cannot help but be caught in a perpetual double-think.
For what it cannot acknowledge is that we did not choose the story
that we should have no story except the story we chose when we
had no story.
8
With examples like these we can understand the difficulty, and perhaps
the impossibility, o f finding some neutral ground f o r judging o r even
mediating among different conceptions of the good with respect to religion. Indeed, the very idea that neutral grounds exist for this difference is
itself a conception of the good with respect to religion.
9
6. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLEWITH PRINCIPLE 157 (1999). One way of understanding this
is to recognize that liberalism, i n the form Dean Fish is describing it, believes that obedience is
somehow not autonomous or, i f autonomous, does not merit the status of rational choice. Thi s is
revealed in the difficulty that liberalism has in distinguishing between the authoritarian and the authoritative.
7. Id. T he problem for the mother is nicely captured in the old Anglican joke about the priest
who would start his sermons with: "As Jesus said, and rightfully so."
8. Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World Without Foundations, 44 MERCER L. REV. 743, 748 (1993).
9. As is implicit in this objection, it is impossible to distinguish neutrally between the good and
religion, as some philosophers attempt, because there are no general conceptions of the good that are
not, in some fashion, specific religious commitments. So, for example, from the perspective of the
mother of the sixth grader in the text, suggesting that our moral lives should be guided by intuitionist's principles is a suggestion that her moral life should be the same as others, at least at an operative level, but her claim is that it should not because she is subject to an authority that does not find
its source in human conduct or thought. There are, of course, theological responses to this. That is
the point: The responses are theological.
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The first and by far the most common method of dealing with arguments like those of the sixth grader's mother is to consider them as
simply beyond the pale. I chose this expression because its etymology
reminds us that what is being done here is to dismiss certain people as
being unworthy of consideration; putting them, that is, outside the communal fence unless they change. This is something rhetoric would never
permit on any terms other than its own.
The second method is indistinguishable from the first, once the first
is seen for what it is. This method accepts that neutrality is impossible in
these matters and offers shared general commitments to the good derived
from some design procedure (excluding from the determination of the
good, ironically given our history, any consideration of religion in the
formulation). These normative commitments are either so minimal as to
do no real work or so tied to a broadly shared, deep, maximal morality as
to beg the question in the sense that one wonders why democracy,
founded as it is on an assumption about our differences, is necessary if
we agree on so very much.
rality
1° Oaref revealed for what they are, the problem for which shared genceralo commitments
u r s e , were a neat solution only returns. For it is never clear
why
the
derived from design procedures should be
w h thin
e commitments
n
preferred
to
the
thick
ones,
there
to be determined in civic argument. As
t
h
e
Michael
Walzer
puts
it,
"[W]e
march
for awhile together, and then we
t
i
e
s
return to our own parades." A n d when we return to our own parades in
t
o
a democracy, we are back to rhetoric.
a
The third and slyest of methods—the hardest, that is, to see as more
m
a
x
i to involve no antecedently given norms, no preof the same—seems
m
a
l
m
o
- 10. Intuitionist approaches, like Robert Audi's, see, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE
RIGHT: A THEORYOF INTUITION AND INTRINSIC VALUE (Princeton U. Press 2004) (it is characteristic of Professor Audi to blur dividing lines and it is also courageous), can be thought of as halfway
houses between what rhetoric and what philosophy require. Professor Audi, as rhetorician, has us
trusting our intuitions, intuitions that, in a democracy, would be manifested in civic argument. Professor Audi, as philosopher, asks us to do what Michael Walzer describes in another context as "correct[ing] our intuitions by reference to the model w e construct out o f those same intuitions."
MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 17 (1987). So the real trusting turns
out to be in the models and not, as rhetoric would have it, the thick descriptions of our intuitions we
would call upon for civic argument. W e can see this in operation in the example Audi offers of
police brutality. I t may very well be, as Professor Audi argues, that the operative agreement we have
on the wrongness of this is an example of intuitionist principles at work. When we do not engage in
some form of social practical wisdom, as intuitionists would have us do, we attempt to put this
agreement into operation in determining through civic argument what we mean by "brutality" and
what we mean by "police," and what we should do about it, that is, in all the cases that make a difference, but in a rhetoric that recognizes no difference between intuitionist's principles and any other
argument other than as determined by their persuasiveness in civic argument.
11. MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD 11
(1994).
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argument principles, no settled outcome requirements, but rather only
conditions for morally acceptable civic argument or "deliberation." I n
application, however, these moral conditions for acceptable civic argument always deprive the argument of its rhetorical nature. That is their
purpose. For what these "rules of engagement" offer, like the other methods, is a way of life that restrains through rationality the risks of rhetoric—the risks, that is, of trusting persuasion. Again, I call upon Michael
Walzer: "Men and women who acknowledge each other's equality, claim
the rights of free speech, and practice the virtues of tolerance and mutual
respect, don't leap from the philosopher's mind like Athena from the
head of Zeus."
12 All three of these methods draw upon principles (freedom, equality), distinctions (the religious from the moral, the moral from the political, the religious from the political), and descriptions (secularity, accessibility, intelligibility, public comprehensibility, and, indeed, the word
"public" itself) to burden religious speech. The meaning of these principles, distinctions, and descriptions, and thus the basis for the restraint on
rhetoric they provide, is always found in sources external to democratic
civic argument. I n other words (words including a metaphor I will draw
upon again near the end of my paper), they all depend upon knowledge
about how the rhetorical game is supposed to come out and insistence
that it be played by citizens in such a manner so that it comes out no
other way. They are all methods, then, that start with a given ideal and
design people to fit it rather than, as democracy and rhetoric both require,
the other way around. Simply and ungraciously put, they are all philosophical evasions to avoid the trust in persuasion that rhetoric and democracy require.
I do not wish to be misunderstood here. I am not at all suggesting
that we should try harder with any of the methods I have just described
(although I believe the second one is the best of the three). I t is necessary to depend upon some antecedently given norms in any determination of what democracy requires of us. F or democracy has some purposes, as does rhetoric, and these purposes, however they might be described, will require some conformity to some antecedently given norms;
such is the nature of purposes. The question is not whether these exist,
but which commitments—and which restraints derived from those commitments—does democracy as a rhetorical community actually require?
Which, that is, are justified in their own rhetorical terms? A n d is the
burdening of religious speech one of these? But these are not the questions any of these three methods were designed to answer. F or they all
12.M at 12.
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simply assume that the risks of rhetoric are far too grave to be trusted to
whatever restraints rhetoric itself might offer. I n order to examine both
parts of this assumption, the risks of rhetoric and its own restraints, we
need first to examine the forms and methods of democratic civic argument to understand what liberal philosophy wishes to control and why.
HI. THE RHETORICAL NATUREOF CIVIC ARGUMENTS
"Running against the limits of language?
Language is, after all, not a cage. "13
Civic arguments are not just exchanges of rational argument. Any one entering a civic argument thinking so would be at a significant civic
disadvantage. I n civic argument, we do not attempt to convince by rational argument, but instead attempt to persuade by any form of argument that humans might find persuasive. What we seek in civic argument is not conviction, but assent. I n seeking assent, the persuasiveness,
even of what is accepted as rational argument, is never considered separately from character and motivation—not just the character and motivation of the one offering the argument but also of those upon whom the
argument depends for its reported facts and of those to whom the listener
turns for helpful assessments of the argument's persuasiveness. So essentially, what one presents as persuasive in any civic argument is never
just the argument but always himself or herself and those upon whom he
or she depends." Even absolutist, fundamentalist, or revelationist arguments are inescapably biographical in this sense and are offered to others
in civic argument as such. Right now I am offering this as descriptive of
civic argument, but in a rhetorical community this is as it should be. So
it is not just descriptive; it is part of democracy's moral claim.
People who present themselves in this way in civic arguments typically do not come to it with an open mind. They most often come seeking assent to their previously determined positions. We may enter civic
argument with all of our individuality intact. But we do so as individuals
who find our identities, primarily, in the mediating associations to which
each of us owes allegiance and to which each to some degree submits his

13. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 117 (Brian McGuinness ed., Joachim
Schulte & Brian McGuinness trans., Blackwell Publ'g 2005).
14. Of course, those not using arguments that are accepted as rational may lose some of the
persuasiveness of their character. T hi s is one of many pragmatic reasons why democratic civic
argument tends towards that which is accepted as rational argument, but it is not a reason I need. I n
rhetorical terms, the only thing distinguishing rational argument from other forms of argument in
this analysis would be whatever persuasiveness it might have. There is no claim, then, that current
pragmatics are how it should be, at least no claim that rhetoric alone provides.
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or her autonomy in order to have an identity.
come,
15 I in
n large
c measure,
i v i c to speak these identities.
suaded
by
others
we are typically surprised by it.
16
a r Wg hu emn in
e civic
n wt argument,
,e
a
p entering
e
ra civic
- argument has some sense that this
w rSinceeeach of us
is the case, each of us is pragmatically moved towards using those forms
and methods of argument that are most likely to surprise. This surprise,
in complex arguments, can often come as immanent critique. B u t the
most prevalent, and perhaps the most persuasive, of these forms is aesthetic arguments, arguments in the nature of further descriptions. These
are the most prevalent in civic argument because civic arguments, interesting ones at least, are almost always ethical disputes and we tend to
talk about ethical matters by showing rather than by explaining. We do
so, I think, because we know, with Wittgenstein, that "[i]f [we] needed a
theory in order to explain to another the essence of the ethical, the ethical
would have no value at all."
17 Pisemetaphor
thods
r h a pbecause
s
metaphor necessarily draws upon that which
we
already
know.
T
h
e
metaphors
that persuade may come from the
t h e
speaker,
m
o as sthey tdo, for example, in the parables. Metaphoric persuasion
may
come
as readily
p e r just
s u
a s from intimations in which the speaker says
more
to
the
listener
than
he or she knows because of metaphors of which
i v e
he
or
she
is
ignorant
or,
at
least, not fully aware.
o
f
For pragmatic reasons, civic arguments are mostly personal, mostly
t
h
e
aesthetic, mostly metaphoric, and seek to surprise the listener into assent.
s
e
m
e
- 15. In religious speech, even from absolutists, fundamentalists, or revelationists, there are
always matters that are shared among these identities, including the language or languages in which
the argument is conducted. The Amish, for example, must know what a computer is to reject its use
and the determination of what it is, that is, how it is to be described for the purposes of argument, is
itself likely to be on shared grounds. Similarly, all accounts of revelation depend upon some shared
understanding of what i t means for something to be revealed. W hen offered as civic argument,
claims of revelation depend for their persuasiveness not just upon a shared conception of the god or
gods who reveal, and his, her, or their authority, but upon an implicit argument about discernment of
revelation—a particular argument, that is, about placing reliability upon particular reports of particular revelations and their particular interpretation and so forth, all of which opens up the argument to
much that will be shared. I t is necessary for the one offering the claim of revelation to distinguish it
from competing revelatory claims, including disingenuous ones. I n other words, and obviously, we
are all, or almost all, bound to a shared, i f thin, culture without which persuasiveness would be impossible. I do not mean to dismiss such arguments from my account, and they could be important
for some. I do not, however, wish to make them central to it, because the primary point is not what
shared grounds persuasion requires but that it is only persuasion that can do this requiring in democratic civic arguments.
16. These identities may or may not themselves require restraints upon civic argument for
moral or other reasons. I t is not, however, a requirement of rhetoric that they do. Pragmatically, I
suppose, to argue in civic argument in a way that violates one's own identity would seldom be persuasive, so rhetoric does, in this sense, reinforce these identities and whatever restraints they may
require.
17. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND THEVIENNA CIRCLE, supra note 13, at 1 1 6
17.
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They are not only this, of course. I have emphasized those aspects of
civic argument that best serve my purposes because they are the aspects
most ignored in other accounts. They are ignored because they are the
tools still readily available to us to persuade even when what might be
called rational deliberation is not possible. I f I am right about this description, however, it means that we do not need to enter into civic argument with any motivation other than to persuade others. We need to
be willing to listen to be able to persuade, of course, but this is listening
for the pragmatic purpose of persuasion.
We do not need to enter into civic argument willing to be persuaded
as if our beliefs were held tentatively and were matters of personal and
autonomous choice." F or it is our own beliefs, our own unshakeable
beliefs, that come from authority no longer of our own choosing, that are
frequently the source of our surprise and upon which both aesthetic and
metaphoric arguments work." These beliefs themselves can be offered
up to others as civic argument, even in their revelatory form. An d like
all others, they will be validated or invalidated for democratic purposes
by whether or not they prompt assent.
213 In civic arguments, as I have described them, no one can know in
advance of the argument, and on either side of it, what will or will not
persuade, including religious speech. While this is offered now as descriptive, it too is part of democracy's moral claim. F or rhetoric, in its
recognition of our mystery, seeks to hold on to this uncertainty about us
by permitting no prior judgments about that which should or should not
persuade us.

18. There is a measure of respect for other persons in the listening required to persuade, but it
is not a respect for what they now think. As anyone seeks to persuade, he or she seeks to know that
which will persuade, to know the opposing positions in order to counter them, and, thus, seeks to
know the other and this, too, can be seen as some measure of respect. Such respect, however, is the
respect civic argument requires and is far removed from any general requirement of mutual respect.
19. In civic argument as I have described it, i t is not only clear that religious claims are not
impasses but the most usefid information that you could provide to someone who is trying to persuade you, especially i f the persuasion is the surprise of what the religious commitment seems to
entail. T he trick for the one trying to gain assent is to know enough and to be good enough to use
the information.
20. Arguments from revelation, on this understanding of democratic civic argument, are far
less disturbing than they otherwise might be and not just because of what must be shared for there to
be arguments from revelation at all. See supra note 15. Any revelation offered as an argument is an
acknowledgment of the need for assent of the other and the need, even in the face of revelation, to
persuade. Furthermore, not even a revelation speaks itself unfailingly to others so there is always an
issue of understanding. As others have noted, even the most dogmatic of speakers will react to an
extreme characterization of his or her own view.
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IV. THE RISKSOF RELIGIOUSRHETORIC
Although some surely w ill, most liberal political philosophers
should not want to quarrel with me too much about this description of
democratic civic argument for it will seem to them all too real. Instead,
their response to it should be: "Left to its own devices, civic democratic
argument is something like this and, because it is, it will not do." F or
these philosophers, civic argument as I have described it is far too risky.
Unless restrained, it invites a chaotic politics which, in turn, invites
force. As for religious speech, my description only makes it abundantly
clear to them why it must be burdened, for we all know how dangerous
unrestrained religious speech is to any democracy. T his argument has
enormous emotional appeal, especially among academics, for democratic
civic argument seems so strident, so raucous, so cacophonous, so careless, and—well, as Christopher Lasch spent much of his life pointing
out—so working class, especially when it takes a religious turn.
Despite this appeal, however, we do not all know how dangerous
unrestrained religious speech is. Therefore, arguments about its risks
have to be offered, and they have been. I cannot, I hope you will agree,
review all the arguments in this form that have been offered as justification for burdening religious speech. I can say, I believe, that they all take
at least one of three forms: religious speech is too divisive (representing
all consequentialist concerns with religious speech), too rude (representing all virtue concerns with the s ame
cerns
21 that are usually, but not always, deontological concerns) to be permitted
Now, I would like to examine the first two and
) , o rwithout
t orestraint.
o
reserve
consideration
of
the
third.
u n f a i r
argument
( r The
e pdivisiveness
r e s e
n t i finds
n one of its clearest expressions in
the
work
of
Professor
Robert
Audi:
" I f I am coerced," he says—we
g
should
read
this
as
referring
to
any
law
restricting my autonomy—
c
o
n
on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a rational informed person,
to do the thing in question, I cannot come to identify with the deed
and will tend to resent having to do it. Even i f the deed in fact is
my obligation, where only esoteric knowledge—say, through revelation that only initiated people experience—can show that it is, I

21. I do not intend to diminish virtue concerns by representing them with the social vice of
rudeness. I n the Southern States, including my own, it is common for children to be told by their
mothers, as I was, that there is "no excuse for rudeness." I always took this to be a serious moral
argument. Here, the argument is that religious speech, because it is rude, is a violation of the good
citizenship that is an internal good of democracy. Violations of the requirements of good citizenship
are their own harm but they also create a risk for democracy because it depends in a wide variety of
ways upon this internal good.
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will tend to resent the coercion. T h i s kind o f basis o f coercion

breeds alienation.
22
To avoid this risk of alienation, religiously grounded arguments that
would encourage the passing o f coercive measure must be burdened.
The form the burden takes in Professor Audi's work may be as mild as it
is complex (whether it is mild or not is much debated), but this mildness
is deceptive. For all moral claims, even those made solely on pain of the
loss of civic virtue, as this one is, tend to show up as civil arguments in
democracies, and especially, as legal arguments. W e should take this
burdening very seriously, as I believe most ordinary citizens in the
United States, people who tend to overreact to any burden place on their
speech, would.
23
22. ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 67 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2000).
23. One frequent argument offered against Professor Audi is the deleterious effect his burdening will have on those of us who are religious. See, e.g., PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE
OBLIGATIONSOF CITIZENSHIP 152-60 (2002). W e do not need to inquire into this here except to say
that i f virtue requires you to make and be motivated by secular arguments when arguing toward
restrictions on autonomy, over time you will become more secular as you attempt to reconcile your
making of secular arguments with what was before a primary self identity as a religious person.
There need be no bad faith in this. I f a speaker accepts that religious arguments can only be made in
these circumstances, virtuously, when combined with secular arguments that also motivate you, as
Professor Audi requires, and no other arguments are so burdened, that speaker would, over time,
come to think of religious arguments as suspect and tend toward offering only secular arguments.
We become what we pretend to be for the sake of civility. I n fact, virtue theory, I believe, depends
to some extent upon this being the case. W e do not need to inquire further, however, because i f
democracy, in fact, requires such harm to religious people, it simply requires such harm, and those of
us who are religious should watch out for it, as we already do. M y claim here is that it does not
require these harms, whatever their extent might be. But, of course, religious people should watch
out for them nevertheless. I offer a thought or two about this in the concluding sections. Democracy, I think, has less demonic potential than other institutions because of its unique openness to that
which is not itself—an openness that trust in that which persuades with its recognition of mystery
seeks to maintain. I t still, however, has demonic potential. M any Christian scholars have reacted to
Audi by insisting that democratic virtues must be consistent with Christianity. This reaction is an
interesting confirmation of Stanley Hauerwas' frequent claim that the church in the United States has
lost its ability to tell the state that it is the state by being an alternative community to it and has because it believes that the task of Christianity is to make democracy work.
Another argument against Professor Audi's position is that those wishing to use religious arguments on one side of most important political issues will be burdened by requirements of good
citizenship while those on the other side will not. I n the typical examples of political issues driven
by strong moral concerns, e.g., physician-assisted suicide, abortion, restrictions on homosexual
marriages or other sexual activities, pornography, and so forth, I could, as a religious person use
unburdened religious argument against coercive laws in political conversations about any of these,
but I could not do the same on the other side. 1 could, for example, argue without burden, as I
would, that socially coercive use of the Pledge of Allegiance when i t contains the words "under
God" is blasphemy. I could not, however, without suffering a burden, use religious arguments on
the other side because to do so would be arguing for a coercive use of the Pledge. I n fact, Professor
Audi says that religious arguments offered against governmental coercion are fully consistent with
liberal democracy, need not be burdened, and are to be encouraged. AUDI, supra note 22, at 75-77.
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Many laws, and many forms of civic arguments encouraging them,
might cause resentment among some citizens, and resentment always
breeds some alienation. I t is not at all clear why this particular resentment is entitled to greater weight. You will occasionally see divisiveness
arguments that do claim, typically on historical grounds, that there is
something uniquely divisive about religious speech. B u t I have never
seen in any of the divisiveness arguments, historical, psychological, or
empirical, support for the claim that religious speech causes more resentment than do other arguments in a democracy. I t could be that the
resentment caused by religious speech is more justified than others, but if
so, its justification would have to be in terms of what should and what
should not be expected in civic argument. This, however, is the question
resentment was supposed to answer.
My primary complaint with the divisiveness concern is not this,
however. M y primary complaint is that the divisiveness of religious argument, whatever it might be, is never measured against the divisiveness
of burdening religious speech. Would it be more alienating to a Jew, for
example, to offer Sunday closing laws entirely on religious grounds with
which he is in complete disagreement or to burden his own religiously
grounded objections to physician assisted suicides? M y guess is that it
would be the latter. For what most determines our willingness to accept
political outcomes with which we disagree is the extent and meaningfulness of our participation in the civic argument about those outcomes. I n
other words, we are such story-telling animals that we will be most wedWe can see, then, that in political conversations about these primarily moral concerns, this difference
favors certain religions over others, at least in this place time. O f course, the current religions favored by his approach may change i f we look outside these typical issues and consider others, such
as environmental restrictions on property use, use of taxes for governmental support of the poor, or
recognition of animal rights. There is, however, a consistent substantive pattern here. W hat is really
being preferred in Professor Audi's approach are those churches most closely aligned with libertarianism, like Anabaptists religions such as the Mennonites. Notice, as well, that the flip side of this is
that certain forms of Christianity are far more likely to be burdened than others, especially those
which read the New Testament as essentially a divinely initiated political campaign. Liberation
theologies, for example, because they favor coercive measures that disrupt the status quo (and thus
reveal what Liberationists argue are the questionable moral and theological assumptions behind our
use of the word liberty), would get the shortest shrift in Professor Audi's approach. T he objection
here is not that Professor Audi's approach neatly favors those religions from which, for their own
reasons, liberal democracy has the least to fear. T hi s might be expected. T he objection is that it
favors any particular religious approach at all. For, i f so, Professor Audi is offering an understanding of the good citizen running counter to his own egalitarian principle. Thi s is the principle announcing that no religion is to be favored in the deliberations of a liberal democracy. I suppose
Professor Audi could just accept this as a discriminatory effect but not a discriminatory intent. I
doubt, however, that many would agree that religions favoring what have come to be right-wing,
Chicago-style, libertarian principles, with their essentially anti-government bent, are somehow entitled to favored status in democratic civic argument.
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ded to those cultures in which our stories are best heard whether or not
they are persuasive.
democratic
24 S o , civic
i targument is really divisive; if it is, to what extent it is;
and
whether
whatever
divisiveness it may have can be eliminated by
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methods
that
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not
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more divisive.
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t wrongness of religious speech in civic argument, according to
the
rudeness
a
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l argument, is not to be measured by its consequences. I t is,
instead, simply rude. A good citizen would not act this way. This arguc
l
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ment derives much of its persuasiveness from its truth in other social setr
tings, social situations, that is, when it is inappropriate—in a Jane Austen
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h
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sort of way—to raise religious issues. T h e virtues of those settings,
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listen.
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i There
v is a corrupted form of this argument, and a corrupting image used to describe it,
common
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popular in American jurisprudence, concerning justifications for the First Amendment.
i c
This argument is known as the "safety valve" justification. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A Gena Theory
r gof the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. REV. 877, 885 (1963). See THOMAS I. EMERSON,
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THE
SYSTEM
u m OFFREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) for a far better version of it. The image, and often
the argument, suggests that more speech is the best way to pacify dissidents, i.e., let them blow off
e n
t
steam
in a harmless
fashion.
, 25. Now, of course, it could be that they are both being rude, but I think not. W hat appears
rude
o in religious speech is, I think, something else. W e sense that people have an obligation to defend positions they are offering as civic arguments. Admittedly, this can be difficult in religious
n
speech.
For example, someone offering a position on some issue derived strictly from her religious
view
e would be entitled to say, when asked to defend it, something like: I can't explain, but I know it
is
o true. This is not rude, but it can be annoying. There is, however, nothing unique about religion in
this because we have a large number of commitments personally grounded in way we cannot explain
f others who do not share them. Commitments, for example, that seem to depend upon the other
to
having
had the same experiences or are derived from aesthetic appreciation. I t may be that we tend
t
to think of religious speech as doing this more than other commitments do, but perhaps this is beh religious matters cut so quickly to our groundings or, perhaps it is because interlocutors, for
cause
whatever
e
reason, want more from them, or perhaps it is because the refusal of the other to assent on
religious
q
ugrounds forces recognition of our position as itself a "belief." I n any case, the description
I have offered in the text of civic argument was intended to suggest that we can say more than we
a in civic
l argument and often do. " I can't explain" is not the end of the conversation i f the conknow
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i
t is really rhetorical persuasion.
26. There are complexities here ignored in the text. W hat I am suggesting here is something
isociological.
e Those who do civic argument well admire those who listen well. But what, then, is the
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practice
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Such an ability to listen is admirable, for what democracy in its
purest form offers to each of us is recognition. I t is good to remember in
this context that the complaint the colonists had against King George was
not that he governed without their consent; it was that he had refused to
listen to their petitions. The historical uniqueness of the liberal democracy these colonists created, prompted by the resentment they felt at not
being heard, was that the recognition it provided to each citizen was not
one that needed to be earned. I t was to be given to all in an identity unshaped by any predefined public role, including religious ones. T his
ideal is an ideal of rhetoric. I t said, to everyone, you have an audience.
It is no wonder then that being an audience for others is admired in democratic civic argument.
In this brief review, I think we can say, at a minimum, that descriptions of the risk that religious speech creates in democratic civic argument—remembering I have not yet considered the fairness argument—
are going to be difficult; and, because they are, it will be very difficult to
assess the seriousness of these risks. Assessing the seriousness of these
risks, however, is something that those seeking to burden religious
speech must do. T h e ir claims all depend upon the risks being high
enough that whatever restraints are to be found within democratic civic
argument itself are not adequate to the task.
27
tice at all, is a narrow one of rhetoric and those who listen well would be admired because doing so
makes them more persuasive for a variety of obvious reasons. There are, of course, ways of admirMg listening that do not turn upon the persuasive advantage it provides. These ways, however, do
not arise within civic argument itself but come from those mediating associations we bring to it.
Some will admire listening, some will not, and civic argument itself offers no basis for distinguishing between the two other than on persuasiveness. Nevertheless, the fact that listening well is currently admired in civic argument is a strong argument against burdening speech rather than asking
more of those who listen.
27. There are, once again, complexities here that I am ignoring. Put in its most straightforward
form, my argument is that external restraints upon democratic civic argument, such as the burdening
of religious speech, violate its foundational trust and are not justified because the risks of this trust
have not been assessed and because the internal restraints of rhetoric are more demanding than those
who make the argument for external restraints have recognized. The ignored complexity is found in
the assumed ability to distinguish external from internal restraints. Som e restraints that could be
described as internal are not required by democratic civic argument's constitutive rules but by its
relationship to practices. Thus, i f democratic civic argument was perceived as too unfair, even when
played in accordance with its own rules, it would lose the support needed for its own maintenance. I
do not think we need to get in to this complexity, for whether these considerations are described as
internal or external, they still depend upon some assessment of the risks involved and some consideration of the extent to which those risks are already addressed by constitutive rules. So, in most
part, but certainly not entirely, they would be much the same. I n any event, i f liberal political philosophers were to start talking in these terms, much of what I have argued for here would have been
accomplished. I have written more extensively on this issue, in the context of understanding the
ethics of the practice of law, in Jack L. Sammons, "Cheaterl": The Central Moral Admonition of
Legal Ethics, Games, Lusoty Attitudes, Internal Perspectives, and Justice, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 273
(2003). 1 hesitate to send you there because what you will find might prove to be my own undoing
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V. RHETORIC'S OWN RESTRAINTS
R is time at last to get to the questions I argued we should have
been considering all along: Which restraints upon argument does democracy as a rhetorical community actually require? Which, that is, are justified on rhetoric's own terms? And is the burdening of religious speech
one of these? I make no claim o f neutrality in trying to answer these
questions. Instead, I seek to find commitments, and the restraints derived
from them, in no source other than the requirements of rhetoric itself. I f
there is a conception of the good offered here, it should be one implicit in
rhetoric alone. Thus, the only restraints that could pass muster are the
constitutive restraints of democratic civic argument. Again, in briefest
summary of the argument to this point: we have found no other restraints
consistent with democracy's foundational trust in persuasion and the recognition of personal mystery this trust requires, nor any risks this trust
creates, at least not yet, that would justify looking elsewhere.
What I am trying to do is very difficult for an obvious reason: anyone coming to this task would bring his own personal commitments to
those norms he values most. I fear, then, that I am doomed to fail at the
task I have set for myself and that my failure will be obvious to you. But
in this context failure is not such a bad thing. For what I am attempting
to do is, and must be, part of an ongoing task within democracy as I have
described it. Constitutive restraints, like any others, are never static, and
the ongoing inquiry into them is, for democracy, also constitutive of it.
This is a work in progress because it always must be a work in progress
if I am to be consistent with my own argument.
Some things are basic. Democratic civic argument requires those
offering civic arguments to seek the assent of others through rhetorical
persuasion. W e may seek assent for confirmation, but primarily we do
so to prevail. What "prevail" means here, and returning to my long postponed metaphor, is that the winner of the game of democratic civic arin this paper. W hether it is or not will turn on whether democracy can be considered a tradition,
other than a tradition of rhetoric. For a variety of reason, I think it cannot. In short form, the argument goes like this: Democracy is a form of government, not a way of life. W hat the American
founders agreed upon, for example, was form, not substance. About that they had enormous disagreement. As a form of government, democracy requires commitments to the good, but those that
it requires it does so with rhetoric. Thus, the tradition that democracy is, i f it is a tradition at all, is of
rhetoric. The excellences of democracy, the ideal of the good citizen it provides, and so forth, are all
to be found in rhetoric, and they are limited in this way. This is not to say that there are not other
traditions that can be associated, culturally, with democracy. I t is certainly not to say that other
traditions cannot become dominant within the civic argument of democracy. I t is to say that none of
those are it. There is a difference then between being an American, for example, and being a democrat. I t is this difference that gets blurred in much of the literature. These, however, must be subjects
for development at another time even though some will rightly think they are central to my argument
here.
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gument gets a justification for the use of the coercive power of the state
that others should accept. They should accept this in the same manner
that those who play other games should accept the outcome o f their
games, acceptance conditioned only on the game being played in accordance with constitutive rules.
ratic
civic
might want to achieve through winning, some de28 W
h argument
a t
sired
t h state
o sof eaffairs, does not matter to the game as long as the justification
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g in achieving these states of affairs is a result of
winning
the
game.
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29 So what then are the constitutive rules or restraints? I t would be
e
foolish and unnecessary to try to lay all of them out in even the most
o
f
summary o f fashion. A l l we need to determine for our purposes is
d
e
m
o
whether a burdening of religious speech is one of them. I t will be useful,
chowever,
- to describe some which can then be used for comparison.
I said earlier that we do not enter democratic civic argument with
any motivation other than to persuade. We do not, given my description
of it, need to enter it willing to be persuaded. A good faith attempt to
persuade, I also said, requires listening to the other to determine that
which might persuade. I t depends, then, on both sides being able to rely
upon what is being said by the other as each attempts to persuade the
other. I f reliance is not merited, if either side is dismissed as simply dishonest, the game ends because no rhetorical persuasion is possible. I n
28. Despite appearances to the contrary, I do understand that there is little choice about "playing the game" as a citizen in a democracy. I can decide not to seek state coercion for my religious
views, and not play the game in this way, but someone else may, and unless I am successful in confronting them and the game is played legitimately, their views will be coercively imposed upon me
at least until the outcome of the next playing. I f ! wish to argue that this imposition is unfair, this is
a social argument about unfairness and it seeks coercive enforcement in the form of restricting a
"freedom to." As such, this would be an argument that could only be made within civic argument
and I would, in seeking the justification civic arguments provides, need to play by the rules.
What we are trying to determine here, however, is what "legitimately" means in all this and
what restraints on this coercion might be found within rhetoric itself. Beyond these restraints, the
rightness of imposing one's belief upon others would be a subject for civic argument. N ow , of
course, majority religious views are favored over minority views, but as we shall see, the restraints
of rhetoric itself would foreclose on any religious issue, leaving the subject always open for another
round of persuasion-seeking assent. Additionally, and much the same, rhetoric itself would prevent
the exclusion of other religious views on any grounds other than those rhetoric provides. And, finally, in a democracy, we simply have to trust persuasion on the unfairness or the bad theology of
imposing one's religious belief on others. And bad theology it often will be, for all the major Western theisms offer some good grounds for rejecting this. The outcome we might desire is not something rhetoric can guarantee. I should add that most often the enforcement of the constitutive restraints of rhetoric will be by those who enforce them now. So, for example, the decision of the
court in Brown v_ Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a self-correction of civic argument
on rhetorical grounds and, I think, is best understood as such.
29. See BERNARD SUITS, THEGRASSHOPPER:GAMES, LIFE, AND UTOPIA 2 0
most interesting
and enjoyable exploration of this idea I have found.
41 ( 1 9 7 8 )
f o r
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the simplest of examples, competing, dishonest politicians in a campaign
cannot persuade each other, that is a given, but they also cannot rhetorically persuade anyone else and, when discovered, eventually lose all audiences capable (even if not willing) of being persuaded. O ne way, an
Aristotelian way, of understanding this is to say that lying politicians are
no longer seeking assent through rhetorical persuasion as democratic
civic argument requires them to do.
3° This same form of argument supplies other constitutive restraints
such as an obligation to maintain the language through which persuasion
is possible; an obligation to avoid non-rhetorical coercion, bribes for example, to obtain assent; and an obligation not to exclude other players
from the game on grounds other than those the game itself provides. Essentially, all these constitutive restraints forbid seeking to persuade, obtain assent, or avoid assent through means that would jeopardize the
game. They are, then, restraints to be willingly accepted by players who
wish to obtain the particular justification for the coercive use of state
power only the game can provide.
There is one constitutive restraint, less obvious perhaps than these,
that may be central to liberal philosophy's concern with religious speech.
It is a constitutive restraint that the game of democratic civic argument
shares with all other games: a prohibition on seeking a final outcome for
the gaMeany issue. I n democratic civic argument, seeking to use or using the jus3I
tification
W h a for the coercive use of the state's power the game provides to
tmake final any particular outcome—whether the playing was about a
political
issue, a political party, a common good, an ideology, or a relii t
gious
belief—is
inconsistent with the nature of the justification sought.
p r e
c32 l u
d e30. sNotice that the lying politician denies to himself part of what we seek to accomplish
ithrough assent, since assent is motivated both by the desire to achieve a certain outcome in civic
argument and by our need to have our views confirmed.
s 31. Although he does not argue it in the same manner, Michael Walzer has made this same
apoint in an interesting way. See Michael Walzer, Drawing the Line: Religion and Politics, 1999
L. FtEv. 619, 633 (1999) ("All that separation requires is that the engaged citizens, religious
nUTAH
and secular, be prevented in exactly the same way from achieving anything like total victory.").
yThis claim about avoiding finality does not require that all decisions must somehow remain sustpended. I f this were the case, there would be no motivation for civic argument at all. Decision must
be made and acted upon, but the way in which these decisions are held cannot be as a final statement
oon the issue.
t 32. There is a risk here that the prohibition on finality will become a way of returning many of
athose external restraints to the requirements of rhetorical democracy that I have argued are inconsistent with its own foundation. This prohibition clearly needs to be cabined in such a way that it reltains substance of its own on one wall and yet does not open itself to non-rhetorical restraints on the
vother. Finality should be interpreted only as a violation of other constitutive restraints, that is, those
finalities that are violations of the requirements of persuasion, of seeking assent, and of the mystery
iupon which these are grounded. Especially important would be those attempts at finality that seek to
c
t
o
r
y
t
h
a
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What are the implications of these constitutive restraints for religious speech? D o they provide any grounds for burdening it? I n order
for this to be the case, religious speech would have to be a form of rhetorical persuasion that threatens rhetorical persuasion itself—similar to
dishonesty, non-rhetorical coercion, exclusion on non-rhetorical grounds,
and finality. I t seems, however, that the only grounds such an analysis
offers for distinguishing arguments on the basis of their substance is the
last restraint mentioned, finality. Thus, as long as the argument of religious speech is not an argument toward finality in some form, there is no
grounds for burdening it. O f course, some religious speech may seek
finality, as other forms of speech might, and some may violate other constitutive norms. T her e is, however, nothing unique about religious
speech in these violations, and by themselves, they offer no reason internal to democratic civic argument for distinguishing religious speech from
any other.
Are these constitutive restraints adequate to the task? This is not
something I can determine, for I do not believe that liberal political philosophers have assessed the seriousness of the risks of trusting persuasion. Even without this assessment, however, I can now assert that their
arguments, standing alone, are not sufficient to justify looking beyond
these restraints for others. And surely the burden is on them because all
external restraints are themselves challenges to the trust in persuasion
that, I argued, is foundational to democracy.
Have I, despite my best intentions, only reproduced the problem in
another form? I s this analysis just another back door for finalizing my
own commitments to what I understand to be a common good? I do not
think so. The justification for constitutive restraints is different from any
other justifications offered for restraint of democratic civic argument. To

exclude voices or arguments from civic argument or to make some voices more important than others in a permanent fashion. B u t what this means in practice, which uses of coercion, and which
argument toward these, should be considered attempts at finality are themselves issues in the ongoing civic argument that is democracy. T o return to the challenging example of Mozert v. Hawkins
offered by Stanley Fish: was the state seeking finality in its requiring of comparative religious education? I think it was. I t was only its assumption that such matters were already final that prevented
it from seeing that this is what it was doing. B y requiring the child's use of the offending reading
materials, the state was attempting to preclude from future argument the idea that religion is not a
matter of comparison, of autonomous choice, and of rational consideration. T he two competing
positions were these: At the district court, after a remand from a decision on a motion for summary
judgment, the Court saw that the mother had "drawn a line, 'and it is not for us to say that the line
[she] drew was an unreasonable one." Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 647 F. Supp. 1194
(E.D. Tenn. 1986) (quoting Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981)). This was reversed
at the Circuit Court because, the Court said, in our society we are required to "live and let live."
Mozen v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987). W e are, however,
required by democracy to "live and let live" only to the extent that rhetoric demands this of us.
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understand this, I want to go back to a quote from Professor Audi I used
previously:
If I am coerced on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a rational informed person, to do the thing in question, I cannot come to identify
with the deed and will tend to resent having to do it. Even if the
deed in fact is my obligation, where only esoteric knowledge—say
through revelation that only initiated people experience—can show
that it is, I will tend to resent the coercion. This kind of basis of coercion breeds alienation.
33
The words, "[Oren if the deed in fact is my obligation," almost go unnoticed in this, but they are the crux of the matter. F or what "obligation"
refers to is the obligation to accept the outcome o f the game i f you
played it and if it was played in accordance with its own constitutive
rules. I t is an obligation, consistent with the restraint of non-finality, to
convert your dissent into future arguments within the ongoing game.
Alienation and complaints about rudeness are really implicit threats not
to accept the outcome of the game. As such, they are not good justifications for external restraints; they are the grumblings of those who fear
their arguments will not prevail.
What then of the fairness argument? I t was necessary to postpone
consideration of fairness as an external normative restraint on democratic
civic argument because, to understand the claim that it is, we needed to
have in place the constitutive restraints just described. These restraints
can themselves be considered matters of fairness, but they rest on different grounds from fairness writ large as it almost always is in liberal political philosophy. The nutshell form of all the constitutive restraints of
democratic civic argument is: Don't cheat! And, whatever else it may
include, the justification for this, as we have already noted, is that cheating within a game denies to the cheater the victory that he seeks.
The burden on fairness in the form of an external normative restraint is to justify cheating at civic argument. General claims of fairness, as they are in the quote from Professor Audi above, are always
claims that something other than the playing of the game is or should be
needed to command my willing obedience to the outcome of it. They are
about ways of cheating. The burden of justifying them, I believe, has yet
to be met because the nature of this burden is seldom seen for what it is.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are religions that cannot play this game with integrity. The
restraint of non-finality, for example, while it does not require an accep33. AUDI, supra note 22, at 67.
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tance of fallibilism or pluralism, does require that the correctness of an
argument be constantly reaffirmed through assent if the state's coercion
of it is to be justified. For example, even if there is an amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibiting abortion, the argument about abortion must be permitted to continue or the justification for enforcing the
amendment is lost. ( It would remain open in the legal and political context of the potential to repeal the amendment.) T h e authority of the
church insisting that abortion be ended, then, could never be made final
by not permitting opposing views to be taught, expressed, studied, lobbied, or offered as civic argument. Some religions may not be able to
abide this continuation of the need for assent.
In the offer of revelations as civic arguments, for another example,
there is recognition of the need for the assent of the other and, thus, the
mystery of others in which democracy finds its grounding, even in the
face of claimed revelations. This can be a religious faith, one that may
be implicit in democracy, and it will not be acceptable to all religions
because of its dependency upon a vague transcendence. I n its refusal to
name this mystery, democracy can steal from this mystery its substance
and its authority for such religions. I t need not do this, but some religions will insist that it does. These religions, along with those in the previous example, are, to some extent or another, excluded from the game if
they are to be true to themselves, and they will pay a price for their integrity. They are excluded, however, on no grounds other than the game's
own terms. I t seems unexceptional to me to say that democracy, however open it might be even to a reexamination of its own premises, need
not tolerate that which can truly threaten its own demise, including true
threats to the demise of that reexamination itself. The trick, of course, is
to know when threats are true. I know of no good way of doing this
other than through an analysis of the constitutive restraints of democratic
civic argument.
Can we hope for more than this in democratic civic argument?
There is, after all, something to the condemnation of civic argument as
strident, dissonant, and so forth. What most of us want is not this, but
calm deliberation toward the good. O f course we can. There is nothing
in what I have described that would suggest otherwise, but that "something more" is fully dependent upon those moral sources found in the
mediating associations (and those many other discourses) that are part of
the identities that each player brings as arguments to the game. As such,
the game comes with self-determined and self-imposed restraints, not
arguments about the conduct of the game itself. I n some cultures, these
self-determined and self-imposed restraints w ill be, in fact, part of a
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speaker's persuasiveness; in others, they may impose a significant disadvantage. Such is the interdependent nature of our moralities.

